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The graduation of Jim Lytton, our former
Editor in Chief, has climaxed his outstanding record
of academic achievement, and although the staff
of the "Barrister News" extends sincere congratulations to him, we also feel a pang of regret for the
loss of his capable leadership. We wish him continued success in his future.

Editor in Chief

I wish to announce the appointment of Edmund
Anderson and Leonard Giblin as Associate Editors,
and the addition of David Sanderford and Bill Casey
to the Editorial Staff. I believe they will prove an
ass·e t to the "Barrister News."

Karl Rubinstein

The Editor

Associate Editors
Edmund Anderson

leonard Giblin
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The Law Day banquet held May 12th 1n the
St. Anthony Hotel's Anacacho Room.

(left to right) The Very Reverend louis J. Blume stands with awardees Dr. Abner McCall, Broth er
Thomas Treadaway, and Judge Ernest Belche r.

AWARDS PRESENTED
AT
LAW DAY BANQUET
One of the highlight of St. Mary's University's
11th Annual Law Day Celebration, held on May
12th, was the Banquet at San Antonio's St. Anthony
Hotel, the keypoint of which was the Awards
Presentation.
The St. Thomas More Award, which is presented for" exceptional contribution to legal education,
the legal profession, and to government," is the Law
School's highest award. This year's recipients were

Baylor University President Dr. Abner McCall and
Brother Thomas Treadaway, S.M., Registrar and Director of Admissions of St. Mary's University for
twenty-nine years.
The Rosewood Gavel Award, presented annually
to an outstanding jurist of the state or nation, was
awarded to Judge Ernest Belcher of the Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals.
After the presentations, Dr. McCall addressed

3

the assembly, which in addition to the Law School
faculty and student body and their guests, included
such dignitaries as St. Mary's University President
The Very Reverend Louis J. Blume; Earnest A.
Raba, Dean of the Law School; The Very Reverend
James Young, President of the Board of
Trustees of St. Mary's University; Chief Justice
Robert W. Calvert of the Supreme Court of Texas;
and Associate Justices James R. Norvell, Zollie
Steakley, Meade Griffin, Jack Pope, Ruel Walker,
~nd Joe Greenhill, all of the Supreme Court; and
Presiding Judge of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals K . p. Woodley, and Justice Charles Barrow
of the Fourth Court of Civil Appeals.

THE AWARDS

In his address, Dr. McCall said that the United
States is a country made up of minorities which disagree among themselves in many ways and upon
many premises. "However," said Dr. McCall, "the
one thing upon which we all agree is our established
system of law. Due process is the basis upon which
we proceed to reach our goals-by following our
judicial system of procedure. Today, we have groups
of people who do not want t o follow these established
procedures."
Dr. McCall designated these groups as some of
the deadliest enemies of our country, for a breakdown of our established pr ocedures would, he said,
bring about a destruction of not only our system
of law, but our way of life: "our advocacy system is
representative of our American system-that is an
airing of conflicting opinions and a resulting discovery of a solution."
"These groups,'' continued Dr. McCall, "want
to aborgate our system of peacably airing conflicing opinions, and substitute a system by which they
shout down opinions opposed to their own. And
by denying persons with opposing views the right
to be heard, these groups, which strangely enough
seem to come from college campuses, are doing more
to destroy our system than any other force. We
need not fear those who blatently assert that they
will cause the downfall of the system, for all good
men will rise to put them down. But these groups
that wear fine lables and parade ostensibly for individual rights or worldwide peace, threaten to
destroy our American ideals centered around the
proposition that a peaceful discussion of conflicting
opinions gives rise to an amicable agreement."
In conclusion, Dr. McCall added, "From law
America derived a sense of procedure and a willingness to abide by it. It is not a procedure which governs disagreements, but one which governs what
methods we should use to disagree-the arriving at
truths by harmonious debate and dialogue, without
force or violence."
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ABOVE, Dean of the Law School Earnest A. Raba is
shown holding the awards which were presented at
the Law Day Banquet. The St. Thomas More Award,
a bronze plaque, is an annual award which is presented upon the recommendation of the Law School
Executive Council to the University Administration to
an outstanding citizen of the nation for his or her
outstanding achievement during the academic year in
the field of law or in his or her contribution to the
legal profession. The award is restricted to judges,
lawyers, law teachers, and laymen who have made
exceptional contributions to legal education, the
profession, or to government.
Some of the former recipients of the St. Thomas More
Award include James R. Norvell, Associate Justice of
the Texas Supreme Court; Judge K. K. Woodley, Presiding Judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals, and
W . Page Keeton, Dean of Texas University Law School.
Some of the past recipients of the Rosewood Gavel
Award, which is presented by the Law School each
year to an outstanding jurist of the state or nation in
recognition of his contribution to the democratic
process, are Robert w. Calvert, Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Texas, James R. Norvell, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of Texas; and J. E.
Hichman, past Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of Texas.

THE RECIPIENTS

Dr. Abner McCall's St. Thomas More
Award is presented by Justice James
R. Norvell .

The Rosewood Gavel is presented to
Judge Ernest Belcher by Judge K. K.
Woodley.

Brother Thomas Treadaway receives
his St. Thomas More Award from
the Very Reverend James Young.

Jim Lytton receives his award
from Justice 'N orvell.

Dick Clarkson receives his
award.

LYTTON, CLARKSON WIN
MOOT COURT COMPETITION

Jim Lytton and Richard Clarkson were the
winners of the annual Moot Court competition at St.
Mary's University School of Law. From this win,
the second year for Jim, they went on to the semifinal Moot Court competition of the State of Texas.
Mike Bahan, whose br ief was selected by the
judges as the best submitted, also won the position
as the alternate team member.
The other competitors were: Bob McConachie,
Bill Hyder, Gerald Lopez, Brock Shamberg, and
Wayland Simmons.
The problem presented in the competition was
6

whether the fully and partially vested portions in
a private profit-sharing plan were property. The
plaintiff was the daughter by a former marriage of
defendant's deceased wife, and, suing through her
guardian, she argued that both vested and nonvested amounts were property, and constituted
community property.
Defendant argued that none of the portions in
the plan were property, because of conditions and
impossibility of calculation into an amount capable
of adjudication.

UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS
by Lloyd Bingham, recent graduate of St. Mary's Law Scho o l, and this year's recipient of t he U.S. Law Week Awa rd

As a general rule the parties to a contract are
free to make whatever contracts they please, so
long as there is no fraud or illegality.1 However
courts of equity have for many years consistently
refused to enforce contracts which they deemed
to be "unconscionable.''2 The draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code sought to eliminate the inherent uncertainty that prevailed as a result of the
common law courts reliance on indirect equitable
means such as adverse construction of language or
public policy to strike down unconscionable contracts.
Section 2-302 (1) provides that:
"If the court as a matter of law finds the
contract or any clause of the contract to have
been unconscionable at the time it was made the
court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause . . . "
As a result of this section, courts are now able
to pass directly on the unconscionability of a contract and to make a "conclusion of law" as to
whether a contract or a particular clause is unconscionable.3 By removing the element of unconscionablility from the realm of the .iury, the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial Code have paved
the way for the development and accumulation of
precedents which should provide the certainty and
predictability needed in this area of the law.
Although, as some of its critics have pointed
out, Section 2-302 does not define "unconscionable,"
the intent of the draftsmen is clearly to prevent
unfair surprise and oppression, and not to disturb
the allocation of fair risks resulting from superior
bargaining power. 4 Thus a party who ultimately
ends up with a "bad bargain" can not gain any
relief from this section as long as the contract,
at the time it was made, was not unconscionable.
The tests of the section are to be applied in the
light of the commercial setting and surrounding
circumstances as of the time the contract was
executed. A contract will not be struck down as
unconscionable unless it is grossly unreasonable as
viewed from the standard of normal necessary business practice for the type of contract involved.5
Unconscionability includes the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties to
the contract together with contract terms which
are unreasonably favorable to the other party. 6
Although the question of unconscionability is
one for the court, Section 3-202 (2) affords a party
a reasonable opportunity to present evidence to the
j udge so as to aid the court in making the determination as to whether or not a contract provision
is unconscionable. A federal district court in Penn-

sylvania7 recently reversed and remanded the find ings of a referee in bankruptcy that a security
agreement entered into between A and B was unconscionable where A was not afforded an opportunity to submit evidence to the effect that the
security agreement was not onerous or unconscionable as claimed.
The recent New York case of Frostifr esh Cor p.
v. Reynoso, 8 which was decided solely on the ground
of Section 2-302, illustrates the type of situation
which this section is intended to control. In the
Frostifresh case, Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant on a refrigerator-freezer purchased from
Plaintiff. The sales contract was negotiated orally
in Spanish between Defendant and a Spanish speaking salesman for Plaintiff. Evidence was admitted
showing that the salesman deluded the Defendant
by advising him that the freezer would cost him
nothing because Defendant would be paid $25.00
bonuses on numerous sales that would be made to
his friends. Defendant then signed a retail installment contract written entirely in English which
he could not read and which was not explained to .
him. The contract called for a cash price of $900.00
plus a credit charge of $245.00. Plaintiff admitted
that the freezer only cost him $340.00. The court
held that they had the power under Section 2-302
to refuse to enforce the price and credit provisions of the contract in order to prevent an unconscionable result. The court stated that in their
opinion this was "too hard a bargain." Defendant
was handicapped by a lack of knowledge both as
to the commercial situation and the nature and
terms of the contract which were submitted in a
language foreign to him. The service charge alone
almost equaled the cost of the freezer---clear evidence of the oppression which was practiced on
Defendant.
(Continued on Page 18)

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

FOOTNOTES
Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank, 246 N.Y.
369, 159 N.E. 173 (1927).
Indianapolis Morris Plan Corp. v. Sparks, 132 Ind. App. 145, 172
N.E. 2d 899 (1961); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz 172 F.2d .<3d Cir.
1948); Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packmg Corporation, 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937).
Section 2-302 U.C.C. comment #1 (1962).
Ibid.
Casenote, 45 Virginia Law Review 583 (1959).
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 121 App. D.C. 315,
350 F.2d 445 (Ct. ot App., D.C. 1965)
In re Elkins-Dell Manufacturing Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa.
1966) .
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(LEFT TO RIGHT) Bill Hyder, Magister; Charles
Roberts, Alumni Coordinator; Steve Ha.,ris, Exchequer;
Bill Harris, Clerk; and Jack McGinnis, Historian.

TOP ROW: Raymond Taylor, Herschel Moore, Gordon
Sauer, Michael Smith, James Guess, Allen Lawrence,
Edmund Anderson. SECOND ROW: Lewis Vandiver,
Barry Edelman, Joe Westheimer, Harry Schultz, Phil
Benson. BOTTOM ROW: J. B. Marshall, Morris Reese,
Michael Donahue, Richard Glaser, Leonard Giblin,
Jeff Morehouse, Edga·r Duncan is not pictured.

PHI DELTA PHI SPRING REPORT
By Bill Harris, Clerk of Phi Delta Phi
Tarlton Inn of Phi Delta Phi legal fraternity
enjoyed a highly successful semester this past
spring. The Spring banquet, the initiation of twenty
new members, and a wealth of individual honors
were high points of an industrious semester.
Election of officers was first on the business
agenda. Heading our administration for the school
year 1967-68 will be the following: Bill H.yd~r,
Magister; Steve Harris, Exchequer; Jack McG1nn1s~
Historian; Bill Harris, Clerk; and Charlie Roberts,
Alumni Coordinator. Kelton Conner had the "hard
luck" to be selected as our chapter's delegate to the
national convention to be held in Miami, Florida,
September 4-7, 1967.
Highlighting the social calendar was the annual
Spring Banquet and Rush Party held at the Petroleum Club in the Alamo National Bank Building. The
Honorable Jack Pope, Associate Justice of the Suprem·e Court of Texas was the guest speaker. Good
food. fellowship and fun was the order of the day
for the more than two hundred fifty Phi Delta Phi
members and their guests. Among the special guests
was our Province President, Merrell Frazer, Jr., of
Tyler, Texas.
Initiation of new members of Phi Delta Phi
was held May 12, 1967, in the Fourth Court of Civil
Appeals. Assisting as Benchers in the ceremonies
were: Justice James R. Norvell and Joe Greenhill
of the Texas Supreme Court, Judge Archie S. Brown,
144th District Court, Bexar County, and Mr. James
8

Castleberry and Mr. Orville Walker, both of the
St. Mary's law faculty. The following outstanding
students were initiated into Phi Delta Phi: Edmund
Anderson, Phil Benson, Michael Donahue, Edgar
Duncan, Barry Edelman, Leonard Giblin, Richard
Glaser, James Guess, Frank Johnson, Allen Lawrence, Jeff Marshall, Herschel Moore, Jeff Morehouse, Morris Reese, Gordon Sauer, Harry Schulz,
Michael Smith, Raymond Taylor, Lewis Vandiver,
and Joe Westheimer.
The celebration of Law Day at St. Mary's School
of Law is always a grand occasion. It was even more
so this year, as the A wards Ceremonies and Cocktail
Party were held in the new, nearly-completed classroom building in the new law complex on the Woodlawn campus . As our portion of the program, Phi
Delta Phi was proud to present awards: to our
past Magister, Mike Moriarity, Tarlton Inn's Outstanding Graduate for 1966-67; to Jim Lytton,
Phi Delta Phi Member-of-the-Year (for national
competition); to Mr. James Castleberry, our faculty
advisor, recognition for his contribution to the work
of our chapter; and to Marty Beirne, Outstanding
Freshman Student for 1966-67.
The chapter congratulates its graduating
seniors upon their successful completion of their
law studies: Mike Bahan, John Courtney, Selden
Hale, Jim Lytton, Mike Moriarity, Ed Taylor, Don
Williams, and Charles Wright. The example .they
have set is a credit both to St. Mary's School of Law
and to Phi Delta Phi Legal Fraternity.

Delta Theta Phi
Spring Report
By Richard J. Clarkson, Tribune of Delta Theta Phi

On April 30th Bickett Senate held its initiation
and is proud to announce the following new members: Harry Ben Adams, III, Ben Barton, Bennie W.
Bock, III, Wendell D. Calvert, Joe A. Cisneros, Donald J. Driscoll, Dr. Ramiro P. Estrada, Charles T.
Felder, Rupert F. Horka, Shelby Hollin, Gerald
Huff, Michael P. Kaliski, Richard G. Morales, Donald
R. Pozzi, Thomas Rocha, Jr., Luis M. Segura, Gus
J. Strauss, Robert Wehmeyer, Leslie Williams, Jr.,
and Marvin B. Zimmerman. The ceremony was held
in the courtroom of the U.S. District Judge Ernest
Guinn. Alumni and members of Bickett Senate were
present to preside in the function and welcome our
new brothers.
At St. Mary's annual Law Day, Robert W.
Coffin, Dick H. Guinn and Michael T. LaHood received Delta Theta Phi awards for service to school
and fraternity. Marcel C. Notzon received the L·eslie
Merrem award for service to school, fraternity and
scholastic excellence. In a d d i t i o n to the many
brothers and alumni present to help celebrate Law
Day, we were delighted to have the company of Mr.
Jim Brady, area representative to the national headquarters of Delt a Theta Phi. Mr. Brady gave a party
for De!ta Thetas in Lake McQueeney on June 2nd.

(Left to Right) BOTTOM ROW: Joe Chapa, Wes
Kuize, Mike Schill. MIDDLE ROW: Dick Guinn, Joe
Bonney, Kirby Ambler, John Davis, Jim Dunn. TOP
ROW: Paul Richmond, Pat Thomas, Dick Clarkson,
Don Hendrie.

This summer, Delta Theta Phi will be holding
its 35th biennial convention in Anaheim, California
on August 13 through 16. Bickett Senate will be
represented by Richard J. Clarkson.
Mr. Luther E. Jones, Jr., prominent Texas appellate lawyer, has been invited to give the principal address to Bickett Senate's Fall rush party.
Bickett Senate plans a very impressive affair to
coincide with the opening of the new law school
facilities.

(Left to Right) BOTTOM ROW: Rupert Horka, Tom
Rocha, Don Puzzi, Bob Wehmeyer, Dr. Estrada, Bennie Bock. MIDDLE ROW: Cha·rles Felder, Gus Strauss,
Shelby Hollin, Mike Kaliski, Joe Cisneros, Luis Segura,
Marvin Zimmerman. TOP ROW: Ben Barton, Gerald
Huff, Harry Adams, Don Driscoll, Les Williams.
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The Class of 1967
has graduated, and it is
w'ith pride and good wishes
that the Law

Schoo~l

watches

them take their place in
the profession and dedicate
their lives to the study and
practice

o~f

law.
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~COCKTAIL PARTY~ A\VARDS
AT

EW L

Law Day for St. Mary's University School of
Law may, for the purposes of allegory, be divided
into two phases. The first phase, the Awards Banquet, is marked by the sole1nnity of honor to those
who have already distinguished themselves in their
profession. The second phase, the Cocktail Party,
is more informal, but it, too, posesses a dignity in
that it is the occasion for the awarding of honors
to those who are yet on the brink of entering their
profession-the law students. Students who have
achieved scholastic distinction and who have proven
their potential value to the legal profession are
honored by those who are now practicing that profession. Students who have made valuable contributions to the Law School as a whole, and to their
fraternal organizations in particular, are given welldeserved recognition by their peers. If one assumes
the requisite point of view, a certain amount of
validity may be seen in the idea that the first phase
of Law Day represents the greatness of the present
-the second phase represents the potential of the
future.
This idea gained additional meaning through the
building in which the Cocktail Party was held, for
it was held in the classroom building of the new
Law Center which is being built to house the Law
School. And in spite of the well-established, though
unwritten, law that a spirit of levity must, of natural causes, prevail at all cocktail parties, the reality
of the buildings and the other buildings of the Law
Center laced the levity with more than a little awe.
It is one thing to see architect's drawings and to
see photographs of buildings under construction, and
quite another to stand inside of a promise for the
future embodied in the concrete and steel of a building well on the way towards completion.

W CENTER

Lloyd Bingham, winner of the United
States "Law Week'' Award, receives the
award from Dean Raba.

Each year Mr. Fred Semaan and Mr. Charles
Lieck, prominent San Antonio trial attorneys, make
a cash award to a senior student who, in the
opinion of the law faculty, demonstrates the greatest potential as a trial lawyer. This year Mr. Semaan
presented the award to Jim Lytton, who has distinguished himself throughout his law school career,
having, among his many other accomplishments,
been previously selected for inclusion in the publication "Who's Who Among Students in American
Universities and Colleges."
The Bureau of National affairs, Inc., of Washington, D.C. offers the United States "Law Week"
Award to the graduating student in law who, in the
judgment of the faculty has made the most satisfactory progress in his final year. This year's award
was won by Lloyd Bingham, a distinguished student
with long-time standing on the Dean's List.

Mr. Fred Semaan presents the annual
Lieck-Semaan Award to James P.. Lytton .
12
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Marty Beirne receives Outstanding
Freshman Award from Barrister's Club
President Jim Lytton .
The Barristers' Club presents annual awards to
students of exceptional merit. The Outstanding Senior Award for this year went to Mike Moriarty, and
the Outstanding Freshman Award was taken by
Marty Beirne.
Tarlton Inn of Phi Delta Phi gave recognition
to several individuals: Mr. James Castleberry, Phi
Delta Phi's faculty advisor, was honored for his
contributions to the Inn; Jim Lytton was designated
Phi Delta Phi Member of The Year; Mike Moriarty
was Tarleton's Inn's Outstanding Graduate, and
Marty Beirne was selected as Outstanding Freshman
Student .
Bickett Senate of Delta Theta Phi Awards went
to Dick Guinn, Robert Coffin, and Michael La Hood,
for service to their school and fraternity. The Leslie
C. Merrem award went to Marcel C. N otzon for
scholastic achievement and support of the Law
School and his fraternity. The award is presented
annually in memory of the Late Leslie C. Merrem
who dedicated most of his life to legal education and
in support of St. Mary's School of Law.
Delta Alpha Delta, the Law Wives' organizat ion conferred the P .H.T. (putting hubby through)
Degrees to the wives of the graduating students.
A wardees were: Kitty Alonso, Beverly Adams, Judy
Ambler, Sharon Burch, Jan Wright, Carolyn Courtney, Sharlene Moriarty, and Carol Williams.
Following the P .H .T. presentations, the Law
Wives presented Mr. Paul Ferguson, St. Mary's Law
Librarian, with a check to be used towards the purchase of books for the library.

Mike Moriarty, winner of the Barrister's
Club Outstanding Senior Award .

(Left to right) Delta Theta F·hi's award
winners Marcel Notzon, Dick Guinn,

Robert Coffin and Michae l La Hood.
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(Left to right) Mike Moriarty, Phi Delta
Phi's Outstanding Graduate; Jim Lytton,
Member of the Year from Phi Delta Phi;
Marty Beirne, Phi Delta P•hi's selection
for Outstanding Freshman Student.

(Left to right) Edna Wright, Delta Alpha
Delta's past president watches as Mr.
Paul Ferguson, Law Librarian, thanks
Delta Alpha Delta for its contribution
to the library. Mrs. Earnest Raba and
Mrs. Carl Walker were honored for services to the Law Wives organization ..

(L.e ft to right) Past president of Delta Alpha D·e lta stands with P.H .T. degree conferees
Sharlene Moriarty, Jan Wright, Kitty Alo·nso, Carol Williams, Beverly Adams, and Sharon
Burch. Carolyn Courtney, who was also a degree winner, is not pictured.
14

CASE-NOTE:

"Prior Testintony" Exception to the Hearsay Rule
by Karl Rubinstein

Recently in a case of first impression the Dallas
Court of Civil appeals held that testimony given in
a prior ·criminal trial by a witness since deceased is
admissable in a subsequent civil trial under the
"prior testimony" exception to the hearsay rule:
BRYANT V. TRINITY UNIVERSAL INS. CO., 411
SW2 945, (1967).
The plaintiff, Charles D. Bryant was the owner
of a restaurant which was destroyed by fire. He
was tried and acquitted on a charge of arson. At
that trial a witness, Morton K. Smith, testified to
the effect that he had certain conversations with
Bryant in which Bryant allegedly revealed intentions to set fire to the restaurant in order to collect
the proceeds of the insurance policies on the building and its contents. Smith testified that Bryant
not only offered to show Smith how he planned to
set the fire, but offered Smith $1,000 to set the fire.
Smith said he refused.
The instant suit was brought by Bryant to
recover from a group of insurance companies for
the fire loss. The companies' principal defense was
that Bryant himself burned the property or caused
it to be burned. Smith has since died and the court
below permitted his testimony in the former trial
to be read to the jury. Bryant assigned this as reversible error.
The court cites McCormick and Ray, Texas Law
of Evidence. Vol. 1, Sect. 941, pp. 719-20 as stating
the general rule involved: "Statements made in evidence upon a previous judicial proceeding may be
received upon a subsequent trial as evidence of the
truth of such statements where the witness who
gave the evidence upon the former trial is now dead
or unavailable, provided the party against whom
the evidence is now offered (or someone else claiming under the same right or title) had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the former
trial upon the same issue as that upon which the
evidence is now offered."
The court said, "So far as we can determine,
our Texas courts have never passed on the question
of whether, under the rule above stated, testimony
given in a former CRIMINAL case is admissible in
a subsequent CIVIL case involving substantially the
sam·e issues. The supreme courts of Illinois and
Oklahoma, however, have written on it. In Mcinturff
V. Insurance Co. of North America, 93 NE 369 (Illinois, 1910) it was held that such evidence was not
admissible because the issue was not the samethat in a criminal case the issue is 'guilt' and in a
civil case the issue is 'property.' We find ourselves
unable to adopt that reasoning, but agree rather,
with the reasoning of the more recent decision of
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in Travelers Fire
Ins. Co. V. Wright, 322 P2 417 (1958), holding that
to define the issue as 'guilt' and 'property' would

be to determine the ultimate issue or result sought
to be obtained by the litigation, whereas the issue
sought to be established by the witness was whether
or not one of the plaintiffs has actually procured the
burning of the building.
We hold that in the instant case the issue was
substantially the same in both cases and that since
appellant was a party to both suits and had full
opportunity to cross-examine the witness in the
criminal trial, there was no error in admitting the
testimony. We consider this ruling to be in harmony
with the rules laid down by our supreme court in:
Boyd V. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. Of Texas,
108 SW 813; Lone Star Gas Co. V. State, 153 SW2
681; and Houston Fire and Casualty V. Brittan, 402
SW2 509."
The problem surrounding the admission of
testimony taken at a former criminal trial in a subsequent civil trial is that authorities differ on the
question of whether the parties and the issues are
the same in a criminal trial and a civil trial to the
degree that they are substantially similar enough
to come within the definition of admissible former
testimony.
The Texas cases cited by the court are not in
point to the exact question, but as will be seen,
they do lay the ground work. In Boyd V. St. Louis
Southwestern Ry. Co., 108 SW 813, testimony taken
at a former trial was objected to as being hearsay
because no sufficient diligence had been shown in
attempting to procure the unavailable witness to
authorize the introduction of the former testimony.
The court laid down the rule that the proper predicate for admission is "to show that the witness'
whereabouts is unknown and that diligent search
had been made to ascertain where he is." Here the
former trial was between the same parties and on
the same issues, and both trials were civil proceedings. In Lone Star Gas Co. V. St'a te, 153 SW2 681
(Tex. Sup. Ct., 1908) the proceedings were again
both civil and the issues and parties were the same.
The court merely announces the rule that: "Testimony of a witness given at a former trial of the
same case on substantially the same issues, and
where there was opportunity for cross-examination,
may be reproduced where it is shown that the witness is dead or that he had become insane, or is
physically unable to testify, or is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, or that his whereabouts is unknown and that diligent search has been made to
ascertain where he is, or that he has been kept away
by the adverse party." Houston Fire and Casualty
V. Brittan (Tex. Sup. Ct., 1966) 402 SW2 509 involves a question of due diligence having been exercised by respondent to secure the presenee of the
(Continued on Page 18)
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GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS AND
CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH
by John Courtney, May 1967 Graduate of St. Mary's law Sch ool

Estate taxation is becoming a more important
consideration in estate planning each year. Such
factors as life insurance, mutual fund participation,
certain employee profit sharing plans or pension
trustsl and appreciation of property are placing a
greater percentage of estates within the reach of
the Federal Estate Tax.
The purpose of this article is to familiarize the
reader with the possible tax savings in advising
property owners, whose real or personal property
may be subject to an estate tax, of the advantages
in making irrevocable2 gift s of such property.
Section 2035 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 provides that any transfer of property for less
than a full and adequate consideration which has
been made within three years of decedent's death
is presumed to have been made in contemplation of
death.3 (emphasis added). This section therefor
raises a rebuttable presumption that any transfer
or gift made within three y·e ars of the donor's death
was one made in contemplat ion of death. If the donor
lives for more than three years after the transfer,
relinquishment, exercise, or release, section 2035
makes the transferor's motive irrelevant. Thus
under present federal tax laws, a gift made more
than three years before the date of death is not vulnerable, but one made within the three year period
is subject to being scrutinized as a transfer to avoid
the estate tax.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Since 1916 the ·e state tax statutes have contained similar contemplation of death provisions;
however in 1926 Congress replaced the rebuttable
presumption with a conclu ive presumption. 4 In 1932
the Supreme Court declared the 1926 change unconstitutional on the theory that to impose a tax on the
basis of a factual assumpt ion that the taxpayer is
not permitted to rebut is so arbitrary as to offend
the Fifth Amendm·e nt. 5 Congress thereupon changed
the conclusive presumption to a rebuttable one. 6 In
1950 the presumptive period was extended to the
present period of three years, and the three years,
and the three year cut off date was added.
TRANSFEROR'S MOTIVE IN MAKING
THE TRANSFERS
Whether a gift made within the three year
statutory period will in fact be subject to the estate
tax depends upon the decedent's motivation in making the gift. The case of United States v. Wells 283
U.S. 102, 51 Sup Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867 (1931) still
remains the principal guide to the meaning of the
phrase "contemplation of death." The opinion interpreted the phrase as not broad enough to apply to
transfers where made with a general expectation
of death that is entertained by all and yet not so
narrow as to apply to gifts causa mortis. The court
held that the statute should apply if the contemplation of death was the inducing cause of the transfer.
A federal court of appeals7 added that it may be
16

enough if thoughts of death played a "substantial"
part in inducing the transfer. Federal Estate Tax
Regulations provide:
A transfer in "contemplation of death" is a disposition of property prompted by the thought
of death (although it need not be solely so
prompted). A transfer is prompted by the
thought of death if (1) made with the purpose
of avoiding death taxes, (2) made as a ~ubsti
tute for a testam·e ntary disposition of the property, or (3) made for any other motive associated with death. The bodily and mental condition of the decedent and all other attendant
facts and circumstances are to be scrutinized
in order to determine whether or not such
thought prompted the disposition.s
The fact that gift and estate tax savings are discussed at the time decedent makes the transfer
does not require a holding that the gift was in contemplation of death, so long as the saving of taxes
was not the generating motive of the gift.9

MOTIVES HELD NOT TO BE IN
"OONTEMPLATION OF DEATH"
Circumstances such as the transferor's age,
health, and frame of mind are relevant and may be
considered in determining the transferor's intent
although they are by no means conclusive. Gifts
and transfers made within the three year period
by donors in their nineties 1 o, or those with a terminal illness 11 , have been held not to have been made
"in contemplation of death", Examples of lifetime
or living motives which have defeated assertions of
contemplation of death are where the pri'mary
motive in making the gift was to provide independent income or security for the donor·s dependents, 12 , transfers to settle family disputes, 13 transfers to relinquish control over property or put contemplated plans into effect,14 gifts motivated by a
desire to help establish the donee in business or
make them financially independent, 15 and the existence of a long established giftmaking policy on the
part of the donee. In the final anlysis, the conclusion as to the decedent's motive usually must be
extracted from evidentiary facts that yield highly
conflicting inferences.
~GIFTS

OF EXISTING LIFE INSURANCE
POLICIES
Life insurance policies have certain unique elements which may make them especially suitable as
the subject of life time gifts. The gift tax on life
insurance is based on the policies net worth.
Internal Revenue Code Section 2042 includes
the decedent's gross estate the value of all isurance on decedent's life receivable by the executor
of his estate or amounts receivable by beneficiaries
from insuranc-e on his life where the decedent " . ..
possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership exercisable either alone or in conjunction with

any other person." Examples of "incidents of ownership" under the Estate tax regulation are the power
to:
(1) change the beneficiary,
(2) surrender or cancel the policy,
(3) assign the policy, or revoke the policy,
(4) pledge the policy for a loan,
( 5) obtain a loan based upon the cash surrender value of the policy16
As to the testamentary nature of life insurance the
court in Hull's Estate V. C.I.R. (3rd Circuit; 1963)
325 F.2nd 367 held:
"Nor does it strengthen the Commissioner's
position that the property was lif·e insurance.
That fact does not make the transfer inherently
testamentary, Estate of Aaron V. Commissioner,
3d Cir. 1955, 224 F. 2d 314, particularly in a
case like this where full ownership rights were
transferred unconditionally, and the policies had
substantial cash value."
The court then reviewed the evidence and determined that the gift of life insurance was not made
in contemplation of death.

LAY THE GROUNDWORK NOW!
The Internal Revenue Service announced that
it will not issue an advance ruling on any matters
"involving the prospective application of the estate
tax to the property or the estate of a living person."
Expressly included in such matters is the question
"whether a transaction is one in contemplation of
death' ~ 17 The executor or other repres·e ntative of the
estate will have a decided advantage if the transferor takes some precautions when the gift is made. In
every contemplation of death action the ultimate
issue is the donor's subjective intention. Thus, if
the donor has a bona fide life or living motive in
making the gratuitous transfer, he should be sure
his motive is properly preserved. The gift should
be made in the presence of witnesses where the
donor ·e xpresses the purpose of the gift. It is ad.visable to avoid making the gift at time of making
one's will, or in leaving a donee who is the natural
object of testator's bounty18 out of the will altogether.
WHAT RIGHTS MAY THE DONOR RETAIN IN
THE TRANSFERRED PROPERTY AND .AT
SAME TIME KEEP THE PROPERTY
OUT OF THE GROSS ESTATE?
If you are persuaded to utilize the available tax
saving life time gratuitous transfers, allow me to
caution you to carefully ready sections 2038, 2036,
and 2037. Section 2038 provides that a decedent's
gross estate includes the values of any interest in
property transferred by decedent, if the enjoyment
of the interest was subj-ect at the decedent's death
to any change through the exercise of a power by
decedent to ALTER, AMEND, REVOKE, OR TERMINATE THE TRANSFER. (Certain limited "ascertainable standards" exceptions) 19. Section 2036
includes in the decedent's gross estate the value of
any interest if the decedent retained or reserved
the right to the USE, POSSESSION, OR RIGHT TO
THE INCOME OF THE TRANSFERRED property,
(1) for his life, or (2) any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death, or (3) for any period
which does not end before his death. Section 2037
provides that decedent's gross estate includes the

value of the interest which the beneficiary can
achieve only whereby he survives the donor and the
donor retained a reversionary interest therein
amounting to more than five percent of the value
of the property. The sketching of the above sections
is provided only to indicate that the lawyer must
consider in advising the prospective donor.
ESTATE AND 1GIFT TAXES OOMPARED
A comparison of the gift tax and the estate tax
rates provided for each bracket will show the gift
tax rates to be exactly 75 % of the estate tax rates.
For example, the lowest estate tax rate is 3 per
cent and the lowest gift tax rate is 21;4 percent. The
highest estate tax tax rate is 77 per cent, and the
highest gift tax rate is 573/4 per cent. Rates for
each bracket consistently bear this four-to-three
relationship. The lawyer can also advise of the advantages of exclusions and deductions available each
year to the donor.
OONCLUSION
If there be a doubt as to whether or not one
will succeed in keeping a transfer of property out
of the state, make the transfer anyway. Nothing
is lost, even though a gift tax may have been paid
on the transfer, since the credit for such tax will
be allowed under section 2012 in preparing the estate
tax return. Moreover, such gift tax if unpaid at
time of decedents death may be included in deductions from the gross estate.

FOOTNOTES:
1. Sec. 2039 (c) provides that certain qualified profit sharing plans

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

12.

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.

and annuities are not includable. But see recent Internal Revenu e
Ruling 67-37 making 2039 (c) inapplicable where the emp loyee
d ecedent h ad certain lifetime rights under the plan.
See IRS Sec. 2038.
"Any Transfer" includes any relinquishment, exercise or release
of a gen eral power of appointment or other interest in property.
Rev Act of 1926 Sec. 302(c), 44 Stat 9, 70.
Heiner v Doonan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932).
Rev Act of 1932 Sec 803(a) 47 Stat 169, 279.
Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v Bowers, 98 F2d 794 (CA 2d 1938),
Cert. den. 306 US 648 (1939 ).
Treasury regulations Section 20.2035-1 (c).
Allen v Trust Company of Georgia, Executor (1946) 326 US 630
66 S. Ct. 389, 90 L. Ed. 367.
Estate of Wm. M. Murphy v U.S. D.C. West Dist Mo 64 USTC
Sec 12,244 (deced ent in ill h ealth and 95 years of age). Estate of
C. B. Kniskean 232 F. Supp 7 (decedent 99 years of age at time
of gifts of cash and stock had the intention to see his grandchildren enjoy the gifts during his lifetime; HELD gifts were
made with motives associated with life and not death.
Decedent at time of transfer of $1,000,000 was 77 years of age and
in poor health. He died 10 months after making the gifts. Heldthe predominant motive in making the transfer was to be able
to remarry without subjecting the property, the subject of the
gift, to the control of his second wife and therefor the property
was not includable in his estate. Lippincott et al. vs Commissioner
7 F2d 788 (1934).
Estate of Carl C. Lynch v Commissioner 35 T.C. 142 (1962) decedent knew at time of transfer that he had terminal cancer. See
also Boyd, Exec v U.S. (D. C. Kentucky; 1961) 192 F. Supp 601
(1960).
See note 10 above.
Hoover, Exec v U.S. 190 F. Supp 601 (1960).
Clark v U.S. 209 F. Supp 895 (1962).
Treasury Regulations 20.2042 (c) (2) .
Revenue Procedure 62-32, 1962-2 C.B. 527.
Davidson's Estate v Commissioner, 158 F. 2d 239 (10th Cir 1946).
(Gifts in trust contemporaneous with execution of will; held
" integrated parts of a single plan, testamentary in nature".)
Examples of adequate external standards are: (a) invasion of
principal in case of need for educational purposes or because of
illness or any other good reason: (b) maintenance, education and
support in the manner appropriate to station in life. Examples of
standards held not to b e adequate are the use of such words as
"circumstances deemed by the trustee-settlor to be necessary", or
"happiness of the beneficiaries".
See Treasury reg ulations Section 20.2001-1 and Section 25.2502-1
( b ).
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CASE-NOTE (Continued from Page 13)
witness whose former testimony he wishes to introduce. The court cites Lone Star Gas V. State,
supra, and says "We adhere to the established rule
as stated in Lone Star Gas." Here again both cases
were civil and the parties and issues are the same.
Thes·e three cases, and McCormick & Ray,
Supra, set out the requirements which must be met
in order for testimony taken at a former trial to be
admissible in a subsequent trial under the "prior
testimony·' exception to the hearsay rule. An important point is that in all o.f these cases the prior
trial and subsequent trial were both civil proceedings. The significance of the court's statement that
it considers its decision, which follows the Oklahoma rule, to be in harmony with these three cases
lies in the fact that it seemingly recognizes no differences between a criminal and civil case in regard to
the admissibility of testimony taken at a former trial,
and that the only requirements which must be met
in Texas are those set out in the cases above and
the character of the proceeding-civil or criminalis seemingly irrelevant.
Since the point had never before arisen in
Texas, the court was forced to go to other j urisdictions to determine the correct rule. There are two
views in the United States both of which agree
on the essential requirements which must be met.
But the point of divergence comes on the interpretation given two of the requirements: "identity of
parties,'' and "identity of issues." The Mcinturff
Case, cited in the Bryant Case, is fairly representative of the minority view which requires strict adherence to the requirements of identical parties and
identical issues. In Mcinturff, the Illinois court said
that the common law rule relating to the admission
of former testimony means that the parties and
issues in the subsequent action must be strictly the
same in both proceedings and that since the parties
in a criminal proceeding are not the same as the
parties in a civil action (the former consisting of
the State and the Defendant and the latter consisting of the Plaintiff and the Defendant) the testimony given in a criminal case is not admissible in
a subsequent civil proceeding ·e ven though the witness who testified is no longer accessable, and the
transaction in question is identical. Mcinturff also
holds, and cites Harger V. Thomas, 44 Pa. 128, as
authority that the issues are not the same : that
"guilt'~is the issue in a criminal case and "property"
is the issue in a civil case.
The n1ajority view is represented by the Oklah.oma .decision in Travelers Fire Ins. Co. V. Wright,
cited In the Bryant Case, which rejects thes·e ideas
saying that the parties are substantially similar
and that the issue is the same: whether or not th~
defendant did the act with which he is accused or
which is bejng asserted against him as a defense.
The point is annotated in 46 ALR 463: "The
weight of authority seems to be to the effect that
on a proper showing of inability to procure the attendence of a witness at the trial of a civil case,
his testimony given in a criminal pros·e cution involving the same transaction is admissable against
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the person who was defendent therein." The annotation lists Iowa, New York, South Dakota and
W~sconsin as being ?f this majority view; and Illinois .an.d P~nnsylvanm as being the minority against
adinis~wn In such cases. This annotation, however,
has since been superseded by an annotation in
79 ALR 1179, but the result is the same; there are
sm1ply more adherents to both views. The annotation .lists the _following among the majority: Californ~a, Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Michigan, Missoun, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South
Dal~ota. ~ho~e states who do not admit are: Pennsylvania, Ilhnms, South Carolina, and Louisiana.
UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS(Continued from Page 7)
In the new Hampshire case of American Home
Improvement, Inc. v. Maclver, 9 Plaintiff contracted
with Defendant for some ' home improvements. At
the same time the contract was executed Defendant signed an application for financing to ~finance
company which contained a blank note and blank
power of attorney to the finance company. The application stated the total amount due, the number
of months that payments were to be made and the
monthly payments, but did not state the rate of
interest. Several days later Defendant received notice of the approval of the application for financincr
which stated that the monthly payments would b:
~42.81 per month for 60 months including principal,
Interest and insurance-making a total payment of
$2,568.00 or an "increase of $809.00" over the contract price. Defendant immediatedly notified the
Plaintiff to cease work and Plaintiff then filed suit
for breach of contract. The court he~d, as an alternate ground of decision, that the contract was unconscionable within Section 2-302 on grounds of price
alone.
In another very recent case, the Attorney Gener~l. of New York was held to have the right to
enJOin Defendant from engaging in an endless chain
transaction consisting of a referral type of sales
program whereby consumers were induced to purchase the products at 2 to 6 times higher than
th.e promoter's costs.1° The Defendant fraudulently
misrepresented that the goods were not obtainable
elsewhere at those prices when in fact the croods
wer~ a:railable elsewhere and at much lower p~ices.
In finding that the price provisions of the contract
were unconscionable within Section 2-302 the court
stated that "No longer do we believe that 'fraud may
be perpetrated by the cry of 'caveat emptor'. We
have reached the point where 'Let the buyer beware'
is .a poor business philosophy for a social order
allegedly based upon man's respect for his fellow
man. Let the seller beware too!"
FOOTNOTES
8. Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 274 N.Y. Supp. 2nd 757 (1966 )
9. American Home Improvement v. Maciver, 105 N.H . 435, 201 A.2d
886 (1964 ) .
10. In re State of New York, 275 N.Y. Supp. 2d 303 (1966 ).

DEVELOPMENT
CORNER

The new Law Center takes form:

A Close-up of the Library ...

The Faculty offices ...

And the class room building.
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Are you a senior law student or a new
attorney?
Looking for your first professional position or
best location for your office?
Do you know which foundation books to select
for your library?

There's an expert in your vicinity who can help
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that concern your practice. He __ makes it his
business to know opportunities occurring in your
area.
Just drop us a line .and we'll send you his nante
and address. Then contact him to see how much
his tips h2lp you.
You could turn his information in to your business.
No charge or obligation whatever for this advice.
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